Overlooking Urban Design: Unseen Spatial Conflict and De Facto Designers of Coastal Space

In the past decade, the design community has been inundated by large competitions and calls-for-proposals for schemes addressing various dangers to coastal urban areas, whether in the wake of high-profile disasters or projective planning responses to looming slow-burn concerns of climate change and sea-level rise.

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Make It Right's call in response to Hurricanes Katrina (2005), Architecture for Humanity's role in Bande Aceh (2006), the Rising Currents show in New York City (2010), Home for All in Japan (2011) are just the most high profile of these. 2013 appears to be a competition crescendo as One Prize's Stormproof, FARROC supported by NYC's Housing Preservation and Development Department, and US HUD-sponsored Rebuild by Design all simultaneous address conditions in New York and New Jersey, while State of Louisiana's Changing Course continues focus in that state. Across these responses, two general directions emerge: on one hand, the "many and small," as in the unfortunately named 'Katrina Cottage' series designed by a range of stars from the Congress for the New Urbanism, distributed by a FEMA pilot program and later for a short period by Lowe's home improvement stores; and, on the other hand, the "grand and 'geologic'" such as the radical visions for New York's harbor presented in MoMA's 2010 Rising Currents show, including the large earthworks of 'Scape Studio and Architectural Research Office. Despite earning design accolades, both groups, in their singularity of scale, are almost without exception limited in their ability to inspire any real application by their insensitivity to the complex political ecology at work across many scales on their given coastal sites. By the same token, the competitions themselves are often backed by sponsors with narrow geographic or programmatic interests, reducing complex coastal issues to headlines: this competition is about temporary housing, this one for waterfront industry, this one just for Ocean County. Together this has made for a general missed opportunity in the regions certain to be one of the most in important for the coming future; meanwhile that future is being written by dozens of other entities outside the discipline or urban expertise, de facto designers, from whom architects may stand to learn a great deal.

It is not useful here to detail the particular merits and shortcomings of each competition or entry nor to debate the 'best' scale at which to operate. Instead it is the purpose of this paper to lay out the vast complex of competing agents—outside formal design, political and ecological—operating in these coastal urban spaces



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Figure 1: Map of New Orleans showing complex of overlaid territories of created by urban activity: administrative, neighborhood, and city services.

that are rapidly becoming the site of incredible design output beyond coastal city centers. The typical narrative of these competition designs is that the coastal city has failed or will fail due to an encroaching antagonist anti-urban coastal nature (whether human-induced or not), requiring the summoning of experts to remake the city to withstand new sieges. Overlooked, however, are the plethora of agents—industrial, agricultural, economic, political, or social—operating on urban coastal space, which are not considered 'urban' influences, and yet produce processes of spatial differentiation, fragmentation, and uneven development—i.e. urbanization.

I would argue that this is the outcome of a narrow definition of 'the urban' and concomitantly of 'urban design' on the part of architects which may limit not only the efficacy of their designs but their ability to participate in the shaping of what will be the most intense locations of design in the coming decades. To reconsider such a limited definition, architects must look to the many existing (non-architectural) coastal agents as fundamental designers of urban space. From these, it may be possible to learn from the innovative practices of spatial transformation, whether administrative, logistic, engineering, or industrial to retool themselves as effective transformers of coast urban space. Toward this possiblity, I use this essay to outline numerous, over-looked 'non-design' actors at work on the Louisiana Gulf Coast, and, surveying their practices, to outline broad categories of tactics for spatial transformation of the urban coast which may be recast for architects.

In contrast to the inability of these competition design responses to enact change in urban space, design is indeed occurring in radical ways in these regions. But the agents of these transformations are not typical design agents, nor are they



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necessarily working in coordinated, socially productive ways, instead advancing only their own interests at a given site, system, or scale. In doing so, however, these atypical agents have become innovative designers of coastal urban spaces with large-scale influence, from which traditionally-defined designers—architects, landscape architects, and planners—may learn.

DENSITY AND VARIETY OF CONTESTATION

The terrain of the littoral, the deltaic, the coastal generally, is increasingly contested by an ever-growing complex of competing interests—even as that territory decreases—each with conflicting claims to rights of use (common or exclusive), access, ownership, operation, consumption, taxation, or to protection for or from that terrain. Identifying these regions, especially confluences of inland waterways and sea, as advantageous sites for human settlement is, of course, no new or particularly surprising statement; key riparian deltas and coastlines have always been significant points of political and economic interest and therefore sites of urbanization and conflict. But recently, in the midst of late modern economic and ecologic factors, these activities, competing claims, and conflicts—again political, economic, spatial, and (therefore) urban effects—have been increasing worldwide not only in intensity and frequency, but also in density. Density here is at once spatial, social, administrative, and geophysical. The phenomenon is inevitable as the physical sites of the struggles at hand are literally decreasing in dimension under the influence of (not unrelated) deteriorating ecological climates. The walls of the (coastal) urban space as a socially tolerable community, administratively functioning political unit, and geophysical place are closing in on the people and interests involved

Figure 2: Map showing complex of overlaid activity in the South Louisiana coastal region, showing similar urban patterns as conventional 'city scales'*t.*

as if a deflating balloon, and along with it the intensity of competition to maintain urban life burns hotter. Coastlines are—in short—dramatically more urban and dramatically more contested.

Importantly, the motivations, ambitions, and tools by which these claims are made grow increasingly varied in design and operation, often at counter purposes. This increase in heterogeneity and complexity of spatial tactics is both caused by and contributing to the increased density and intensity of urbanization in coastal areas. Perhaps most significant are the tools—technical, administrative, legal, financial, spatial, ideological, and material—being put to use by competing interests in and on coastal space. The most powerful actors—public or private—in these areas are, in most cases, not explicitly urban or spatially-motivated interests, but they increasingly pursue their goals by direct spatial intervention. But while this is so, a scant degree of involvement has been shown by designers in a collaborative fashion with these interests, meanwhile space and techniques for its transformation and political contestation are being rapidly innovated by those interests that are engaged.

COMPETING ACTORS: INTERESTS

Like urban space generally, major actors on coastal space are generally characterized as state (public) or non-state (private) actors. We think of the usual examples of local municipal districts, federal agencies on the one hand, and private citizens, businesses, and industry groups on the other. In the case of the Mississippi River coastal region, the key civic powers are the cities of New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and others and the uniquely organized parish governments, overlaid upon these are the myriad state and federal entities including the state Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority and the Department of Natural Resources, and federally, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, United States Geological Survey, and the special roles played as of late by the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Flood Insurance Program which it also administers. Privately, there are individual and joint landholders, overlaid with separate owners and lessees of navigation rights-of-way across, mineral rights below, and exclusive rights of exploitation as in oyster leases or oil and gas fields. Again as in urban space, the highly fine-grained division of labor and of jurisdiction leads to an extensive proliferation of actors in coastal space, within each of those broad headings—often competing at odds with one another in both private and public spheres.[2] The point here in exhibiting exhaustively the contesting voices, on-going struggles, or their battleground landscapes is to show that (a) there are a great many competing interests, each with their own individual spatial logic and kit of tools, and (b) their strategies depend on the innovative manipulation of social and ecological space to achieve their end goals, whether fundamentally spatial or not. Therefore it is sufficient to simply outline them in the diagram above and discuss here their activities only in general.

But, of course, these categories are not only broad, but hazy.[3] Does a mineral regulatory authority protect public resources or provide infrastructure for private gain? Do local individual business and cooperative create competitive edge for private industry or ensure social reproduction and stability for a community? The categories are merely nominal; the responsibilities and actions of the actors are more indicative of what and who is within their purview.

However, it becomes easy to cut through this administrative haze and myriad overlapping of interests by understanding the competing groups through the form taken by the subject in which they have interest, to maintain or exploit. Regardless of nominal categorization, ‘public’ or ‘private’, the competing

interests organize themselves around one of four interests: *land-based* capitals, *resource-based* capitals, interests of *access*, and community or *human* reproduction.[4] Once again these are familiar groupings, fundamental urban interests, which work out in the territory and on the scale of the coastal region worldwide – an urban territory at large. They are old categories of interest and, despite a territorial re-casting to coastal terrain worldwide, little changed from age-old struggles in the urban space of ancient bounded cities or sprawling metropolises.

COMPETING ACTORS: GOALS

Operating within their many separate, yet intersecting, spheres on one of the four above categories of concern, each can also be seen to be motivated toward a specific aim relative to their area of concern, a trajectory driving the activity and inevitable conflict. In all cases the actors seek to prevent loss of value or viability for their interests. Some are on active attack toward increasing that value or viability, whether by accumulation, expansion, speculation, or destruction of those held by others. Industries and public agencies interested in the land itself – as *conditions* of production (e.g. minerals), *elements* of production (e.g. waterways), or *instruments* of production (e.g. fisheries)[5] – may seek to expand their holdings in whatever form they may take. They may expand the value and viability of their interests by increasing their publicly perceived 'importance': an agency convinces the public at large by coercion through publicity or legislation that their interests are vital or common to all, while economic interests similarly seek to expand markets and effective demand by similar tactics. Rather than creating actual increased value or viability of their interests, actors may speculate on future values or sustained viability of their interests, potentially producing the same net effect (though also potentially effecting the opposite), that products of offshore extraction, the lifestyle of a city, and even the qualities of park recreation, will be in greater public demand. If these methods fail, the value and viability of one interest may be increased at the explicit expense of another. Eliminating access to space by park users, fisherman, or nearby residents can be an effective means for increasing exclusive value or viability by noxious industries with access to the same space, by extortion, devaluation, despoliation or simple destruction, while inversely a governing agency may do the same by revoking access, devaluing assets, or destroying the authority of an industry, actively devaluing its viability.

More conservatively, coastal interests seek to maintain their value and viability by safeguarding what value they have already embodied in their organization—resources, territory, rights-of-access, infrastructures, or people—by inheritance or previous rounds of active increase. On the whole this task consists of fending off efforts like the above from other actors, public and private, whether within their same category of interest or another. Shipping interests, for example, seek to maintain total access to all necessary or potentially necessary ports of call at the capacities necessary in order to maintain values embodied in the goods being transported by minimizing transport costs and maximizing local market value. Drilling, pipelining, and fishing interests seek to maintain *exclusivity* of right to their resources or territory, whether by legal or other forces. Cities and flood insurance programs also seek to maintain the viability of their holdings and the value locked up in properties and policies, by both maintaining critical masses of populations (that is, demand, sometimes captive) and extracting premiums (and crucially, ensuring there is value from which to extract that premium), legislative or incentive. Through these actions actors may maintain the power and infrastructure to maintain their value and viability through continued re/production.

While actors and categories of interests may vary, the goals are always the same, to maintain value and viability in space, and in continual conflict.

COMPETING ACTORS: (SPATIAL) MEANS

Whether maintaining or increasing the value and viability of their interests, the majority of these actors are not directly motivated by space itself – its occupation, design, legislation, construction, consumption, or destruction. And yet, the means by which they pursue their aims are overwhelmingly spatial. In exerting their carefully composed strategy on targeted space and with specific technique, these actors become powerful, innovative de facto designers. This fact is what makes coastal space not only the site of intense contestation, but also highly contested territory itself. Efforts to safeguard value and viability through space and those to actively increase them differ little in kind, but the aim of one goal may well fade into the other as it changes in degree. Intensity and innovation in the design and transformation of coastal space by these unconventional designers can be distinguished in two broad examples: increasingly *fortified boundaries* and the increasingly complex *design of standards, codes, and maps.*

Boundary: Safeguard. As total territory shrinks or consolidates—land, water, right-of-way, or frontage—competition escalates for the remaining areas. Drillers, pipeliners, commercial fishers, and vacation home owners seek legal back-up in safeguarding their territories from competing actors. No coastal quirk, the demand of private interests for securitization of exclusive property rights is one of the oldest tenets of urbanization and the state. But not only among private entities are coastal lands broken up; lands are divvied up into municipal and administrative districts, drainage basins and levee board districts, resource extraction leases (oysters, fisheries, oil and gas fields), evacuation districts, and navigation jurisdictions (modulated by draft or pilot association). In coastal Louisiana alone, there are 1,833 onshore oil and gas fields, 29,545 offshore blocks, 26,150 oyster leases, 13 drainage basins, and 15 levee boards.

But these divisions are not only abstract legal cadastres nor limited to large bureaucratic swaths. They are also re-enforced by highly local and physically substantial fortifications. During the historic flooding of the Mississippi Valley in 2011, individual homeowners in the Delta, finding themselves unprotected by state infrastructures and often without or unable to purchase homeowner's insurance, took to crafting their own individual earthen ring levees just large enough to surround and protect their modest flood-prone homes, not all successfully. The politics (and economics) of drainage and storm protection are powerful motivators that drive significant migrations of humans and capital and lead to vast spatial transformation. Seawalls, levees, and canals – not to mention elevations of the land itself by fill – are effective tools to safeguard value and viability of landed interests.

However, the most common use of boundary fortification to safeguard spatial interests is real estate and insurance's response to inundation, whether gradual or all at once. In the years after the federal inundation of New Orleans, the real estate market effectively bifurcated, with properties that had been flooded—surviving, destroyed, or rebuilt—fetching prices well below the previous market rate, and unflooded properties seeking enormously inflated prices. While in many regards this is an obviously expected outcome as owners attempt to safeguard their embodied values (that viability also becoming valuable itself), it is neither an isolated event nor one that "just happens." Architecture has a direct role in the securing of that bifurcation and continuing to support it, physically and symbolically.

Legitimated as economic and ecological 'safe zones', those 'surviving' areas begin to take on their own distinguishing architectural language. Not always in the overt grammar that speaks directly to a superior topography (e.g. slab-on-grade foundations or maximized lot coverage), this architectural language of demarcation and fortification speaks also in subtler terms to the taste and means of the residents found there. In the same way urban divisions typically distinguish themselves in socio-economic terms, there exists an architectural language of exclusion based on topographic and ecologic terms (though these are always intertwined), adding to the radical polarization in value and viability, real or perceived in the city.

Boundary: Value Add. Once identified, it is here where goals of value preservation merge into those of active value increase, more often than not at the expense of others' interests. Where at first the aim was to solidify boundaries of individual or group's interests—property, market share, community, etc.—those reinforced borders become active tools of value creation. The value and viability of, for example, a topographically 'safe' neighborhood becoming firmly established by efforts to demarcate the area as physically and aesthetically separate based on ecological grounds, the focus of those borders then turns towards exclusion and the construction of a physical and conceptual 'outside' where that value and viability is decidedly not present. Establishing an 'outside' is a way of devaluing those outside interests and questioning their viability, and simultaneously, reinforcing or augmenting that of the inside. Once again these are not mere intangible administrative manipulations, but concrete, intentionally designed transformations. Branding a select territory as 'The Sliver by the River' to distinguish its exceptional safety from the worst of inundation in an urban area that has had its entire property stock devalued en masse served, at first, to safeguard residual viability for the area, gradually concentrating investment and architectural attention, meanwhile questioning viability in other neighborhoods. Once branded, the area is the target of redevelopment and urban design schemes which cater to and reinforce the value being injected into the land, architecture, and social affluence of the area. Meanwhile, not simply neglected, the 'outside' becomes the venue for designers to imagine alternative value improvements, 'more appropriate' to the decidedly separate area, such as demolishing neighborhoods for 'urban wetlands' to 'return areas to nature' that 'never should have developed in the first place'. Paradoxically then, 'improvements' of interests outside of fortified areas prove to be net value increases to those within (primarily through improved drainage) and simultaneously net devaluation for interests on the new 'outside' (residents, generally), rendered with gloss images of recreation amongst the safety of 'sustainable wetlands'.

It is not that ecological differences between areas subject to or not subject to inundation are not real or significant. They certainly carry great relevance. But the possibility of their manipulation by design to serve increased valuation for some and devaluation of other areas is just as significant. Beyond aesthetic improvements and neighborhood scale investments, tactics for fabricating and fortifying an outside can be seen in the manipulation of National Flood Insurance Program rate maps which engages in 'ecological redlining', ostensibly to support the financial viability of the program and the homes being insured at large, but also serving to push investment and value increase to certain designated areas. Certainly the most significant in scale, design, and topographic impact in the case of coastal Louisiana, the Army Corps of Engineers' 100-year storm protection levee system completed in 2011 encloses New Orleans and its suburbs with hundreds of miles of earthen levees, reassuring residents with their scientific, angular geometries. The material bulwarks

are also supplemented by a consolidated administrative authority, the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority, coordinating between the many subdistricts to render the strongest increase of value and viability for the incorporated area and interests. Meanwhile, those actors and interests left outside 100-year storm protection (ostensibly by reason of their already foregone viability) are now firmly devalued, some even to the point of negative value (assets locked up in land that is neither profitable nor salable), finding themselves strategically neglected by the complex of border-instantiating design. Ironically, these devalued interests are now subject to further affront by other actors with still viable interests, for example shipping and petrochemical industries who are now able to acquire or exploit those devalued holdings under minimal resistance by present owners and equally minimal administrative oversight, an 'accumulation by degradation'.[6]

Design Standards, Value Safeguard. Working to divide space both *within* the fortified boundaries and *without*, actors show their high degree of design skill at a finer scale in a second example. Fortified spatial categories, architectural or administrative, and carefully determined social and actuarial terms for continued viable use of space are effective design tools for controlling a typically fluid coastal space, both in plan, as in insurance rate maps (notably FEMA 'Special Hazardous Flood Areas'),[7] and vertically through NFIP 'Base Flood Elevation' requirements.[8]

Following complete destruction and devaluation of individual property—for livable use or market value—in response to many coastal disasters (ecological or engineering), landowners have been offered state-backed buyouts at pre-devaluation assessments. Most recently, New Jersey declared its $300 million-backed intention to purchase 1,000 residential properties in just a handful of communities,[9] and most sensationally, the Louisiana Land Trust, at its peak, held title to nearly 11,000 properties purchased in buyback programs since 2005.[10] A move to safeguard values for those owners and for the general civic viability of areas financially and ecologically, such programs are always highly coordinated and targeted—that is to say designed—and achieve deliberate demolition of a certain kind of space while creating entirely new urban possibilities in other places for specifically designed uses. But while preserving the financial viability of some (and perhaps that of insurers generally) and the city by curbing the proliferation of risk in haphazard redevelopment, the new public owners effectively radically overpaid for now massively devalued territory and must find some way to, again, transition from a 'value safeguard' to a 'value add' strategy, in social and money capital terms.

Design Standards, Value Add. This is how the Louisiana Land Trust and the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority—to which the bulk of its properties have been transferred in 2012[11]—become arguably the most powerful designers of urban space in any American city. Once again the intentions of a coastal actor are not explicitly architectural—in this case, largely financial, political, and ecological—but nevertheless their means are. With a database of fragmented lands scattered across the region, the embodied value of each remains low, and in order produce value increase, social and monetary, the LLT and NORA must produce intricate designs for 'spatial repackaging', in short: dispossession, excess capital absorption, subsidization, and selective redistribution. Carving up some, gluing together others, and inventing site-specific incentives, terms of use, administrative and financial infrastructures, and design guidelines the resulting products come out looking a good deal different than the urban condition of their origin. The most common method of increasing the potential for productive use, is 'landbanking' which cements together smaller holdings for a single large developer or commercial interest, as for a new

Wal-Mart in the Gentilly neighborhood of New Orleans or—certainly the most high profile—a 32-city-block medical complex near downtown. Each of these is tailored to the (constructed) availability of land and designed infrastructure provision of the particular area, i.e. site-specific design. But not all parcels can be 'banked'; the majority are non-contiguous. NORA has developed the highly successful 'Lot Next Door' program to operate at this scale, selling vacant properties to abutting owners. More specifically still are the implementations of 'design standards' by government entities[12] that – in very specific architectural terms – limit how a building may be constructed relative to Base Flood Elevations, effectively managing how and by whom space may be used in specific districts. While costly elevations are required for many low-lying areas under these programs, buildings and districts deemed 'historic', usually the long-affluent or newly-gentrified districts, are exempted from such requirements. The forceful but abstract hand of legal codes is supplemented by well-meaning responses from designers which, sometimes positively and other times negatively, corroborate and formalize the motives of public development policy.[13] These two scales can generally be correlated, in the former, with private capital-oriented value creation, and in the latter, with social value creation. However, there are exceptions such as the Musician's Village[14] and Make It Right[15] aimed at the latter form of value creation while operating at the scale of the former. It is perhaps not coincidental then that these are also the two most explicitly architectural examples and speak loudly to the opportunity for design in the midst of coastal urban transformation, even if not full successes.

CONCLUSION

In some ways these examples are not particularly new or groundbreaking but well known scenes of urban industrial and planning practice. However, surveying them together, densely overlaid in the larger territorial space of coastal landscapes, they become evidence of an expanded practice of in coastal urban space and potential tools for an expanded scope of design. Despite their obvious connection with 'non-urban' or 'non-design-related' coastal ecologies and maritime economies, the actors discussed, the interests they pursue, and the strategies they employ are under direct urban influence. They are likewise actively designing and urbanizing coastal territories. Increasing urbanization globally is "accompanied by a decentralization in the organization of productive activity"—forcing a disjuncture between categories of 'the city', the space of design, and those of coastal and urban activity—"at the same time as specific kinds of relations spring up to bind them together," such as urban and ecological crises of coastal landscape: shrinking coastal territory, and coordinate concentration and intensification of urban activity.[16]

Given the congruence of coastal territory and urban space, the gamut of actors in frequent, combative operation within coastal regions can be seen as some of the most powerful and active designers of urban space today, operating beyond 'city' dimensions. And yet they are often overlooked by professional designers creating coastal urban visions. But these 'de facto designers' inevitably use common spatial tactics in innovative ways that designers would do well to investigate. The influential strategies discussed—boundary and design standards—are inherently urban, incredibly intense in coastal regions, and fundamentally *spatial* tactics. From these actors, designers should expand their range of tools in order to engage more directly with the appropriate scales, mix of actors and interests, and the spatial strategies presently operating within coastal sites which may not be overtly designated 'designers' in order to more effectively realize future visions for coastal communities, the home of the majority of urban dwellers.

ENDNOTES

1. Jarvie, Jenny. 16 December 2007. "Post-Katrina Cottages Get a Lukewarm Welcome." *Los Angeles Times*.
2. Examples include: Department of Natural Resources (state) and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (federal) for natural resources. For minerals there is the state Department of Natural Resources, federally the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, oil and gas companies and industry groups, for transportation the FHA and LaDOT, for navigation the USACE, for environmental protection the DEP, the EPA, the USGS, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, for land use the Office of State Lands, for drainage and flood protection the local levee boards and the CPRA, for urban land development the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority, for waste disposal the Department of Environmental Quality, and so on.
3. Marxian categories outlined succinctly by Harvey in Chapter 11, "The Theory of Rent" in David Harvey. 1982. *The Limits to Capital*. (London: Verso).
4. Campanella, Richard. 2008. "Geography of Urban Growth, 1788-2008" in *Bienville's Dilemma: A Historical Geography of New Orleans*. (Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Louisiana Lafayette), 154-158.
5. Harvey is quick to point out that, "*devaluation, arising for whatever reason, is always particular to a place, is always location specific.*" In Harvey, David. 2007 [1982]. *The Limits to Capital*. London: Verso, 378. [emphasis in original]
6. Johnson, Leigh. 2010. "The Fearful Symmetry of Arctic Climate Change: Accumulation by Degradation." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 828-847.
7. Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2013. "Flood Plain Management." http://www.fema.gov/floodplain-management/.
8. National Flood Insurance Program. 2013. *Flood Insurance Manual*.
9. "South River Homeowners Mull Buyout After Hurricane Sandy." 28 July 2013. *The Associated Press*.
10. Louisiana Land Trust website: www.lalandtrust.us/.
11. Hammer, David. 8 January 2012. "Road Home Buyout Properties Being Sold Back to New Orleans." *The Times-Picayune*.
12. See for example New Orleans' Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance (No. 23911), a city-specific code developed through FEMA's larger program that helps to develop codes for effective 'Flood Plan Management' throughout the country.
13. See for example the work of the Louisiana State University Coastal Sustainability Studio, "Lower Ninth Ward and Bayou Bienvenue: Design Strategies and Scenarios for Change" (2010) and Deborah Gans. June 2011. "Below the Sill Plate: New Orleans East Struggles to Recover." Design Observer: Places Journal.
14. A rebuilding project led by Habitat for Humanity, Harry Connick Jr., and Branford Marsalis, to develop a city block of affordable homes for musicians after Katrina in the Ninth Ward of New Orleans.
15. A non-profit and international design competition founded by Brad Pitt and William McDonough to design prototypical homes to rebuild the Lower Ninth Ward.
16. Harvey, 2007: 272.